Introduction
The processing of uncertain information has always been a hot topic of research since mainly the 18th century. Up to the middle of the 20th century, most theoretical advances have been devoted to the theory of probabilities through the works of eminent mathematicians like J. Bernoulli (1713), A. De Moivre (1718), T. Bayes (1763), P. Laplace (1774), K. Gauss (1823), S. Poisson (1837), E. Borel (1909) , R. Fisher (1930) , A. Kolmogorov (1933 ), B. De Finetti (1958 , L. Savage (1967) , T. Fine (1973) , E. Jaynes (1995) to name just few of them. With the development of computer science, the second half of the 20th century has became very prolific for the development of new original theories dealing with uncertainty and imprecise information. Mainly, three major theories are available now as alternative to the theory of probabilities for the automatic plausible reasoning in expert systems: the fuzzy set theory developed by L. Zadeh in sixties (1965) , the Shafer's theory of evidence in the seventies (1976) and the theory of possibilities by D. Dubois and H. Prade in eighties (1985) and, very recently, the unifying avant-gardiste neutrosophy theory proposed by F. Smarandache (2000) .
This paper is focused on the development of a new theory of plausible and paradoxical reasoning which can be interpreted as a generalization of the theory of evidence. After a brief presentation of the Dempster-Shafer theory in section 2, we set up the foundations of our new theory in section 3 and discuss the justification of the new rule of combination of uncertain and paradoxical sources of evidences. Several illustrative examples of the power and the usefulness of our new theory are also presented and compared with results drawn from the classical Dempster-Shafer theory. is then a composite event (disjunction) of the frame of discernment. represents the strength of some evidence provided by the source of information under consideration. Condition (1) reflects the fact that no belief ought to be committed to but not the total belief committed to 
Definition 1. The DST starts by defining a map associated to a body of evidence
For any given belief function Bel& ( , one can always associate an unique information granule 
Plausibility Functions
Since the degree of belief Bel& 
The dual of (6) implies (11) The comparison of (3) with (10) 
2 We adopt here the historical definition of the pignistic probability coined by P. Smets, but in the meantime proposed independently. (see also the discussion ¡ £ ) has been strongly criticized in the past decades but is now accepted since the axiomatic of the transferable belief model developed by Smets
from an idea initiated by Cheng and Kashyap. Another approach for the justification of Dempster's rule of combination based on the Mathematical Theory of Hint (MTH) has been also proposed by Kohlas. . The relationship between experimental observations and the DST belief functions is currently a hot topic of research. Several models have been developed for fitting belief functions with experimental data. A very recent detailed presentation and discussion on this problem is also available.¨¢ In the bayesian framework, if we consider independent sources of information (bodies of evidence) become bayesian basic probability mass assignments and if we accept the principle of indifference within the optimal bayesian fusion rule.
The complexity of DS rule of combination is important in general (when we deal with large frames of discernment) since the computational burden for finding all pairs , we will have to perform
. Fortunately, there exists a fast Móbius transform which allows an efficient implementation of DS rule of combination § ¥ ¦ £ § ¢ to deal with problems of high dimension.
Example 2. A simple example of the Dempster's rule of combination Consider the simple frame of discernment
about the true nature of the weather at a given location for the next day and let consider two independent bodies of evidence 7 and 7 § providing the following weather forecasts at
The Dempster's rule yields the following result (where
Hence, in this example, the fusion of the two sources of evidence reinforces the belief that tomorrow will be a sunny day at location (assuming that both bodies of evidence are equally reliable).
Example 3. Another simple but disturbing example
In 1982, Lofti Zadeh¨¢ ¡ has given to Philippe Smets during a dinner at Acapulco the following example of using the Dempster's rule which shows an unexpected result drawn from the DST. Two doctors examine a patient and agree that it suffers from either meningitis (M), concussion (C) or brain tumor (T). Thus,
. Assume that the doctors agree in their low expectation of a tumor, but disagree in likely cause and provide the following diagnosis
If we now combine belief functions using Dempster's rule of combination, one gets the unexpected final conclusion
which means that the patient suffers with certainty from brain tumor!. This unexpected result arises from the fact that the two bodies of evidence (doctors) agree that the patient does not suffer from tumor but are in almost full contradiction in regard to the other causes of the disease. This very simple but practical example shows the limitations of practical use of the DST for automated reasoning. Some extreme caution on the degree of conflict of the sources must always be taken before taking a final decision based on the Dempster's rule of combination. A justification of non effectiveness of the Dempster's rule in such kind of example based on an information entropy argument has already been reported. and the assignment problem for a single observation and two tracks ( and § ). Assume now the following two predicted bba for the two tracks:
Now assume to receive the following new bba drawn from attribute observation of the system
The observation bba . If we use the DST to solve this very simple assignment problem between the observation and several predicted bba, one gets from the DS rule of combination exactly the same result, i.e. for
From these two same results only, it is impossible to find the correct solution of this simple assignment problem. Moreover the weights of conflict between sources for the two combinations of evidences are respectively equal to
for the fusion 
Using the Blackman's approach, there is now a larger likelihood associated with the first assignment (hence the right assignment solution can be obtained now based on the max likelihood criteria) but the difference between the two likelihood values is not so big . . . . As reported by S. Blackman, ¡ more study in this area is required. Dr. Tchamova has recently proposed, in a private communication to the author, to use the city-block and Euclidean distances
to measure the closeness between and then to choose the assignment which corresponds to the minimum distance. Using her approach, one gets
The Tchamova's approach can therefore solve the anomaly of the DS result in this assignment problem. becomes now the correct assignment we are looking for. In other words, let's consider
Using the DS rule of combination, we get now the following results
. From these bba
it is clear that the assignment solution is directly given here by the fusion
which has the minimum conflict factor. In this second case, we do not need to look for any additional approach to reach the right solution. Nevertheless, it is still interesting to examine the result of the distance approach in this case. We get then the following distances:
The decision drawn from the minimum distance criteria will yield here the wrong assignment if this approach is chosen.
Therefore, as seen in this simple example, there is no unique and reliable approach to solve the assignment problem based on DST for both cases. In general, we will always have to look for the suitable approach (minimum conflict, Blackman or Tchamova approaches) which allows us to get (hopefully) the correct solution of the problem. Given the difficulties in choosing the best approach to use, it can be rather difficult to find an automatic inference system depending on the complexity of the assignment problem. We will present at the end of this paper how our new theory of plausible and paradoxical reasoning can help to solve this assignment problem. By using only an unique and simple criteria based on our generalized entropy like measure, we will be able to provide the correct solution for the two cases of the assignment problem presented in this example. 
Conditional Belief Functions

Introduction
As seen in the previous disturbing example by Zadeh, the use of the DST must be done only with extreme caution if one has to take a final and important decision from the result of the Dempter's rule of combination. In most practical applications based on the DST, some ad-hoc or heuristic recipes must be added to the fusion process to correctly manage or reduce the possibility of high degree of conflict between sources. Otherwise, the fusion results lead to a very dangerous conclusion (or cannot provide a reliable result at all). Even though the DST has provided fruitful results in many applications (mainly in artificial intelligence and systems expert areas) in past decades, we strongly argue that this theory is still too limited because it is based on the two following restrictive constraints :
C1-The DST considers a discrete and finite frame of discernment based on a set of exhaustive and exclusive elementary elements.
C2-The bodies of evidence are assumed independent (each source of information does not take into account the knowledge of other sources) and provide a belief function on the power set
Foundations for a new theory of plausible and paradoxical reasoning
These two constraints are very strong in many practical problems involving uncertain and probable reasoning and dealing with fusion of uncertain, imprecise and paradoxical information. This important remark has already been discussed.
Schubert has proposed a new partitioning management technique to overcome mainly the C2 constraint.
¡ ©
The first constraint is very severe actually since it does not allow paradoxes on elements of the frame of discernment ¤ . The DST accepts as foundation the commonly adopted principle of the third exclude. Even if, at first glance, it makes sense in the traditional classical thought, we develop here a new theory which does not accept this principle of the third exclude and accepts and deals with paradoxes. This is the main purpose and innovation of our new theory referred to as the DSmT (standing for Dezert-Smarandache Theory of paradoxical reasoning).
¥
The constraint C1 assumes that each elementary hypothesis of the frame of discernment ¤ is finely and precisely defined and we are able to discriminate between all elementary hypotheses without ambiguity and difficulty. We argue that this constraint is too limited and that it is not always possible in practice to choose and define a frame of discernment satisfying C1 even for some very simple problems wherein each elementary hypothesis corresponds to a fuzzy or vague concept or attributes. In such cases, the elementary elements of the frame of discernment cannot be precisely separated without ambiguity such that no refinement of the frame of discernment satisfying the first constraint is possible.
Example 5. As a simple example, consider an armed robbery situation having a witness and the frame of discernment (associated to the possible size of the thief) having only two elementary imprecise classes
. An investigator asks the witness about the size of the thief and the witness declares that the thief was tall with bba number
, small with bba number
and is uncertain (either tall or small) with
. The investigator will have to deal only with this information although the smallness and the tallness have not been precisely defined. The use of this testimony by the investigator (having also some additional information about the thief from other sources) to infer on the true size of the thief is delicate especially with the important missing information about the size of the witness (who could be either a basketball player, a dwarf or, most probably, is of average size. Actually, these two hypotheses are not incompatible since some dwarfs really enjoy to play basketball).
Hence, in many situations the frame of discernment ¤ can only be described in terms of imprecise elements which cannot be clearly separated and which cannot be considered as fully disjoint so that the refinement of the initial frame into a new one satisfying C1 is like a graal quest that cannot be accomplished. Our last remark about C1 constraint concerns the universal nature of the frame of discernment. It is clear that, in general, the same frame of discernment is interpreted differently by the bodies of evidence or experts. Some subjectivity, or at least some fortuitious biases, on the information provided by a source of information is almost unavoidable, otherwise this would assume, as within the DST, that all bodies of evidence have an objective/universal (possibly uncertain) interpretation or measure of the phenomena under consideration. This vision seems to be too restrictive because usually independent bodies of evidence provide their beliefs about some hypotheses only with respect to their own worlds of knowledge and experience. We do not go deeper here in the techniques of refinements and coarsenings of compatible frame of discernments which is a prerequisite to the Dempster's rule of combination (see
for details). We just want to emphasize here that the DST cannot be used at all in all cases where C1 cannot be satisfied and we have more generally to accept the idea to deal directly with paradoxical information.
To convince the reader to accept our radically new way of thought, just think about the true nature of a photon? For experts working in particle physics, photons look like particles, for physicists working in electromagnetic field theory, photons are only considered as electromagnetic waves. Both interpretations are true, there is no unicity on the true nature of the photon and actually a photon holds both aspects which appears as a paradox for most human minds. This notion has been accepted in modern physics only with great difficulty and many vigorous discussions about this fundamental question were held at the beginning of the 20th century between all eminent physicists at the time.
¡ ¥
The constraint C2 hides also a strong difficulty. To apply the Dempster's rule for two independent bodies of evidence , it is necessary that both frames of discernment ) have to be compatible and to correspond to the same universal vision of the possibilities of the answer of the question under consideration. Actually, this constraint itself is very difficult to satisfy since each source of information has usually only its own (and maybe biased) interpretation of elements of frame of discernment. The belief provided by each local source of information mainly depends on the own knowledge frame of the source without reference to the (inaccessible) absolute truth of the space of possibilities. Therefore, C2 is, in many cases, also a too strong hypothesis to accept as foundations for a general theory of probable and paradoxical reasoning. A general theory should include the possibility to deal with evidences arising from different sources of information which have no access to absolute interpretation of the elements of the frame of discernment ¤ under consideration. This yields to accept paradoxical information as basis for a new general theory of probable reasoning. Actually, we will show in the forthcoming examples that the paradoxical information arising from the fusion of several bodies of evidence is very informative and can be used to help us take a legitimate final decision.
In other words, our new theory can be interpreted as a general and direct extension of probability theory and the Dempster-Shafer theory in the following sense. Let be the simpliest frame of discernment involving only two elementary hypotheses (with no more additional assumptions on¨ and¨ § ), then the probability theory deals with basic probability assignments
the Dempster-Shafer theory extends the probability theory by dealing with basic belief assignments
our general theory extends the two previous theories by accepting the possibility for paradoxical information and deals with new basic belief assignments
Notion of Hyper-Power Set
be a set of ! elementary elements considered as exhaustive which cannot be precisely defined and separated so that no refinement of does not constitute an exhaustive set of elementary possibilities, we can always add an extra element¨ such that¨ ¡ 6 ¥ F G ! describes now an exhaustive set. We will assume therefore, from now on, that ¤ characterizes an exhaustive frame of discernment.
¤ will be called a general frame of discernment in the sequel to emphasize the fact that ¤ does not satisfy the Dempster-Shafer C1 constraint.
Definition 7. The classical power set
has been defined as the set of all proper subsets of the set of monotone Boolean functions (i.e., functions expressible using only AND and OR set operators). This problem is also related to the Sperner systems Example 6.
for
is not known and is still under investigation by the mathematical community. Cardinality numbers 
The General Basic Belief Masses
Note that we do not define here explicitly the complementary . These definitions are compatible with the DST definitions when the sources of information become uncertain but rational (they do not support paradoxical information). We still have
Construction of Pignistic Probabilities from gbba
The construction of a pignistic probability measure from the general basic belief masses
is still possible and is given by the general expression of the form
where
We present here an example of a pignistic probabilities reconstruction from a general and non degenerated bba which is shared by both¨ ,¨ § and¨ will contribute tö with weight 1/3. Since, moreover, one must have
, it is necessary to normalize It is important to note that any fusion of sources of information generates either uncertainties, paradoxes or more generally, both. This is intrinsic to the general fusion process itself. For instance, let's consider the frame of discernment
and the following very simple examples:
Example 9. Consider the rational information granules
Example 10. Consider the uncertain information granules
Example 11. Consider the paradoxical information granules
Example 12. Consider the uncertain and paradoxical information granules
Note that this general fusion rule can also be used with intuitionist logic in which the sum of bba is allowed to be less than one (
and with the paraconsistent logic in which the sum of bba is allowed to be greater than one (
) as well. In such cases, the fusion result does not provide in general
For example, let's consider the fusion of the paraconsistent source
with the intuitionist source
. In such case, the fusion result of these two sources of information yields the following global paraconsistent bba
In practice, for the sake of fair comparison between several alternatives or choices, it is better and more simple to deal with normalized bba to take a final important decision for the problem under consideration. A nice property of the new rule of combination of non-normalized bba is its invariance to the pre-or post-normalization process as we will show right now. In the previous example, the post-normalization of bba 
It is easy to verify from the general fusion table that the pre-or post-normalization step yields always the same global normalized bba even for the general case (when
), because the post-normalization constant
is always equal to the product of the two pre-normalization constants 
Justification of the New Rule of Combination
Let's consider two bodies of evidence and their cores
. Following Sun's notation, ¢ ¥ each source of information will be denoted
where (29) The fusion of the two information granules can be represented with the general table of fusion as follows 
We look for the optimal rule of combination, i.e. the bba , the Lagrangian associated with this optimization problem under equality constraints is given by (we consider here the minimization of 
which can be written more concisely as . . .
The last constraint in (41) 
Definition 11. In the classical definition (based only on a probability measure), one always has
& Y X ( $X $ ¥
. This does not hold in our general theory of plausible and paradoxical reasoning and we propose to generalize the notion of entropy in the following manner to measure the self-information of a general source of information:
It is very important to note that these rules apply only on irreductible propositions (logical atoms) (46) and (47), the proposition has first to be reduced to its minimal representation (irreductible form).
Example 13. Here are few examples of the value of the hyper-cardinality for some elementary and composite irreductible propositions X . We recall that¨ involved in X are singletons such that
Thus, the evaluation of
for any general irreductible proposition X can always be obtained from the two basic rules (46) But it is important to note that the maximum of uncertainty is not obtained when
but rather for a specific bba is less informative than previous sources since there is ambiguity between the two propositions¨ and¨ § , but it is more informative than 7 since the discrimination power (our easiness to decide which proposition supports the truth) is higher with . This comes from the confusion between the intrinsic information supported by the proposition itself and the information supported by the whole bba
Blackman's Example Revisited
Let's take back the Blackman's example described in example 4 for the very simple assignment problem. In the DSmT framework, one has to deal with the following prior (predicted) and observed gbba defined on hyper-power set ©
as follows:
Using the DSm rule of combination, we get now easily the following results
The values of the generalized entropy of the updated gbba
. The increase of the generalized entropies (i.e. the difference between the predicted and updated generalized entropies) are given by
. This result means that the incorrect assignment
has noticeably increased the generalized entropy of the system as one would have rightfully expected. The best assignment solution is obtained by selecting the fusion (assignment between a track and a measurement ) which generates the smallest increase of the generalized entropy. In this framework and in this case, the Tchamova's approach based on the minimum city-block or Euclidean distances provides also the correct assignment with track
Neither the use of classical entropy
nor the entropy evaluated from pignistic probabilities allow us to get the correct assignment solution from the DST framework in this example.
Let's consider now the previous predicted gbba
but now with an observation bba which agrees with
Using the DSm rule of combination, we get now the following results
, which are very close but the entropy increases become now
. By selecting the smallest increase of the generalized entropies, we get again the correct assignment with track § for this second case. As within the same example discussed in the DST framework, the minimum distance approach fails here to obtain the correct assignment since one has now
In concluding remark, we have shown through this simple example how a simple and unique criteria based on our generalized entropy-like measure drawn from our DSmT can serve as an useful tool to solve the assignment problem for both cases investigated here. No case-dependent approach is then required here to get the correct solution as we had already argued in example 4. However, more theoretical investigations must be performed in order to prove that our criteria is actually the best one to solve the assignment problem in general.
Zadeh's Example Revisited
Let's take back the disturbing Zadeh's example¨¢ ¡ given in section 2.4. Two doctors examine a patient and agree that it suffers from either meningitis (M), concussion (C) or brain tumor (T). Thus,
. Assume that the two doctors agree in their low expectation of a tumor, but disagree on the likely cause and provide the following diagnosis
The new general rule of combination (26) yields the following combined information granule
From this granule, one gets
If both doctors can be considered equally reliable, the combined information granule
mainly focuses weight of evidence on the paradoxical proposition ¤ £ which means that the patient suffers from both meningitis and concussion but almost surely not from brain tumor. Actually, this conclusion is coherent with the common sense. Then, no therapy for brain tumor (like heavy and ever risky brain surgical intervention) will be chosen in such case. This really helps to take important decision to save the life of the patient in this example. A deeper medical examination adapted to both meningitis and concussion will almost surely be done before applying the best therapy for the patient. Just remember that in this case, the DST had concluded that the patient had brain tumor with certainty . . . .
Mahler's Example Revisited
Let's consider now the following example excerpt from a paper by Ronald Mahler.
¢
We consider that our classification knowledge base consists of the three (imaginary) new and rare diseases corresponding to following frame of discernment
We assume that the three diseases are equally likely to occur in the patient population but there is some evidence that phlegaria and pinpox are the same disease and there is also a small possibility that kotosis and phlegaria might be the same disease. Finally, there is a small possibility that all three diseases are the same. This information can be expressed by assigning a priori bba as follows
be the prior belief measure corresponding to this prior bba
. Now assume that Doctor © and Doctor © § examine a patient and deliver diagnoses with following reports:
The combination of the evidences provided by the two doctors (26) yields the following bba
The combination of bba 
Therefore, the final belief function given by (22) is
Thus, on the basis of all available evidence, we are able to conclude with high a degree of belief that the patient has phlegaria which is coherent with the Mahler's conclusion based on his Conditioned Dempster-Shafer theory developed from his conditional event algebra, although a totally new and more simple approach has been adopted here.
A Thief Identification Example
Let's revisit now a very simple and classical thief identification example. Assume that a 75 years old grandfather is taking a walk with his 9 years old grandson in a park. They saw at a distance of 50 meters a 45 years old pickpocket robbering the bag of an old lady. A policeman looking for some witnesses of this event asks separately the grandfather and his grandchild if they have seen the thief (they both answer yes) and how old approximately was the thief (a young or an old man). The grandfather (source of information ¢ reports that the thief was a young man with high confidence 0.99 and with only a low uncertainty 0.01. His grandson reports that the thief was a old man with high confidence 0.99 and with only a low uncertainty 0.01. These two witnesses provide fair reports (with respect to their own world of knowledge) even if apparently they appear as almost fully paradoxical. The policeman then sends the two reports with only the minimal information about witnesses (saying only their names and that they were a priori fully trustable) to an investigator. The investigator has no possibility to meet or to call back the witnesses in order to get more details.
Under such condition, what would be the best reasoning of the investigator to infer the age of the thief to eventually help to catch him? Such kind of simple example occurs quite frequently in many witnesses problems actually. A rational investigator will almost surely suspect a mistake or an error in one or both reports since they appear apparently in (almost) full contradiction. The investigator will then try to take his final decision with some better information (if any). If the investigator uses our new plausible and paradoxical reasoning, he will define the following bba with respect to the frame of discernment
and the available reports 7 and 7 § with bba
The fusion of these two sources of information yields the global bba
Thus, from this global information, the investigator has no better choice but to consider with almost certainty that the thief was both a young and old man. By assuming that the expected life duration is around 80 years, the inspector will deduce that the true age of the thief is around 40 years old which is not too far from the truth. At least, this conclusion could be helpful to interrogate some suspicious individuals.
A Model to Generate Information Granules
8 & (
from Intervals
We present here a model to generate information granules . In such cases, some preprocessing must be performed before applying the general rule of combination between such sources to take the final decision. We present here a model to generate information granules . In such cases, some preprocessing must be done before applying the general rule of combination between such sources to take the final decision.
In the DST framework, we recall that the simpliest and easiest transformation to convert ). This new model presents however a degree of freedom since one has only two constraints (48) and (49) 
The solution of this equation can be easily found using classical numerical methods. It is also easy to check that the second derivative is always negative and therefore reaches its maximal value when 
Conclusions
In this paper, the foundations for a new theory of paradoxical and plausible reasoning have been developed. The DSmT takes into account in the combination process itself the possibility for uncertain and paradoxical information. The basis for the development of this theory is to work with the hyper-power set of the frame of discernment relative to the problem under consideration rather than its classical power set since, in general, the frame of discernment cannot be fully described in terms of an exhaustive and exclusive list of disjoint elementary hypotheses. In such general case, no refinement is possible if applying directly the Dempster-Shafer theory (DST) of evidence. In DSmT, the rule of combination is justified from the maximum entropy principle and there is no mathematical impossibility to combine sources of evidence even if they appear at first glance in contradiction (in the Shafer's sense) since the paradox between sources is fully taken into account in our formalism. We have also shown that, in general, the combination of evidence yields unavoidable paradoxes. Through many illustrative examples it was shown, that the implementation of the proposed theory leads to conclusions that agree with human reasoning and can be very helpful in making decisions for some complex problems where the classical DST usually fails. This new theory provides also a theoretical bridge between the combination of paradoxical source of information and the Smarandache's logic. 
